I believe that justice is a matter of respecting individual rights and that our having rights does not depend on the fact that it maximizes welfare (or any other consequence). Consider the following counterexample to the utilitarian view.
Suppose that it would maximize human happiness or welfare to take an eye from a person with two eyes (selected at random, perhaps) and transplant it to someone who is blind. Wouldn't we all agree that each person's right to control and maintain his or her body makes it wrong to do so? I think this example shows that rights are meant to act as constraints on what can be done to maximize welfare.
Of course, someone might wish to donate one of their eyes in order to help someone else. People do sometimes donate organs to others -- family members perhaps. But while we would praise someone for such a gift, almost no one would say that anyone is
morally required (or required by the demands of justice) to do it.
The same thing applies to the rights of property. We can't take away someone's property any more than we can take away one of their eyes just to maximize welfare (or to increase the welfare of some group of people).
And, by the way, this points to another problem with utilitarianism. In ordinary moral experience, some things are morally good, but they are way beyond what we are obliged to do. Utilitarianism collapses that distinction. We are always obliged to do the best thing.
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