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| Positive
Rights
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Ayesha
Speaking
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We come back over an over to the distinction between positive and negative rights. Which rights can be justified and how? Are we limited to the non-interference rights of classical liberalism and modern libertarianism? Or are there arguments that will justify positive rights that go beyond
non-interference?
Here's one possibility from an article I read recently by the philosopher Samuel Scheffler. He wrote a criticism of Robert Nozick years ago. He assumes, with Nozick, that the capacity to plan and lead a meaningful life is what makes people different. But if that capacity is the justification for having rights, what rights does it justify? Scheffler
says that the function of rights is to safeguard that capacity. But if that is so, doesn't it carry us way beyond non-interference rights?
Shouldn't our rights guarantee us at least the minimum required to have a decent chance to lead a meaningful life?
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