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| Moral
Rights
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Professor
Sidgwick Speaking
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Dee has begun to talk about rights as the core of a moral theory. I want to underscore a crucial (and traditional) distinction: the distinction between negative and positive rights.
Negative rights are rights not to be interfered with in holding a belief or taking some action. For example, the negative right to speak or travel or publish a book or to marry.
When critics go beyond these rights and begin to talk about a right to health care or a job or a decent standard of living, they are
talking about positive rights. It is not freedom from restraint that is being advocated when we support positive rights. If A has a positive right to X (for example, medical care) then someone else has an obligation to provide A with X (and not just to stand aside while A pursues X).
Assuming that people have moral rights of some sort, are those rights limited to negative (non-interference) rights or do they also include positive rights to the means necessary for having or doing certain things?
One further point. I think you will discover that the REASONS we offer as a justification for rights (including property rights) are of great importance. In some cases it may be that the reasons offered will allow us to determine the limits of the rights
in question or the range of circumstances under which they are to be respected.
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