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| Conclusion
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Professor
Sidgwick
Speaking
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Our time is just about
up. Let's see if we can pull together at least a few things that we may agree on about the concept of justice.
First of all, justice is a portion of morality, but not the whole of morality. It seems to be a sort of minimal morality -- a set of rules that must be kept. But there is much more to morality beyond respecting justice.
Second, justice is not the same as the good. There are many good things to do that are not required by justice. For example, it maybe a very good thing for me to volunteer to work for a non-profit agency; but justice does not require me to do so. On the other hand, there may be things that justice permits that are not good. As Dee has indicated, libertarians may believe that justice permits us to ignore the problems of those who do poorly in the labor
market; but most would agree that it is not good to do so. Indeed, it is good not to do so.
Third, the unjust or injustice is not the same as wrong. It may be wrong to tell a lie, but it is not unjust.
Fourth, justice seems to apply mainly to questions that are concerned with the distribution of benefits and burdens. But there seem to be other uses of the concept of justice. Sometimes we speak of justice as having to do with basic rights -- not all of which are concerned with distribution. For example, if someone is denied the right of conscience or to free speech, we say that she is treated unjustly. There may be no common core of meaning
here, but most issues of justice have to do with distribution.
Fifth, we all agreed that justice required us to treat equal cases equally. This has been said since the time
of Aristotle. The rule of equal treatment seems to be part of the core
meaning of
the concept. But it has limits. It does not tell us which cases are equal. Nor does it tell us
how to treat the cases that are equal. The rule of equal treatment is, as philosophers say, "formal" rather than "material."
And finally, it is clear that our agreement breaks down when we try to answer the questions left open by the rule of equal treatment. Dee wants a set of individual rights that protect the individual
from abuse. Ann wants us to focus on consequences, and prefers the ethical view called utilitarianism. Fred wants a theologically based ethics. Ayesha is sympathetic to the communitarian philosophers. John has suggested that we look at a view called autonomism. Vera is skeptical of any attempt to discover moral
generalizations and tends to focus on the moral ideas that develop in
concrete historical situations.
I said at one point that some sort of pluralism might be the best solution at this point in time. I still think that may be true, though I am far from certain. There seem to be counter-examples to all
of the popular theories. That is what inclines me toward some form of pluralism.
Karen Lebacqz has suggested that each of the main theories of justice has left a "permanent legacy" for us. Each has influenced our understanding of justice. Perhaps the situation is like that of the legendary
group of blind men examining an elephant. Each feels a part of the great creature's body and thinks it is the whole. But the person
with normal vision realizes that each has discovered one aspect of the whole.
Pluralism might allow for this. But how would the different elements
be combined in a way that is not arbitrary? John has pointed us toward
that question, and I think he is right to do so. Pluralism stands or
falls on the strength of the answer.
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