Now let me mention another philosopher who wrote at length on human
rights. Alan Gewirth (who was not a libertarian) developed what we
might call a deontological theory of rights. It was deontological in
that it did not argue on the basis of consequences. Gewirth believed
that "it is possible and indeed logically necessary to infer,
from the fact that certain objects are the proximate and necessary
conditions of human action, that all rational agents logically must
hold or claim, at least implicitly, that they have rights to such
objects." He regarded "freedom and well-being" as the
necessary conditions of action. Each individual must asset a right to
these conditions, and acknowledge the right of others to the same. You
might read his essay called "The Basis and Content of Human
Rights."
I'm not sure that Gewirth's argument works. I'm undecided. That's
why I learn toward Lomasky's argument based on prudence. but Gewirth
may be on to something. One of his students, Roger Pilon, tried to
develop a specifically libertarian theory of rights based partly on
Gewirth's ideas.
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