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Many philosophers have discussed the injunction to treat equal cases equally. Most agree that it needs to be supplemented by a determination concerning which similarities and differences are morally significant. This is true because any two actions are similar in some respects and different in others. Here are some remarks by H. L. A. Hart, a philosopher of law. Hart's comments concern just and unjust laws, but similar points could be made about actions in general.

Hence justice is traditionally thought of as maintaining or restoring a balance or proportion, and its leading precept is often formulated as 'Treat like cases alike'; though we need to add to the latter 'and treat different cases differently'. So when, in the name of justice, we protest against a law forbidding coloured people the use of the public parks, the point of such criticism is that such a law is bad, because in distributing the benefits of public amenities among the population it discriminates between persons who are, in all relevant respects, alike....These simple examples are, however, enough to show that, though 'Treat like cases alike and different cases differently' is a central element in the idea of justice, it is by itself incomplete and, until supplemented, cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct. This is so because any set of human beings will resemble each other in some respects and differ from each other in others and, until it is established what resemblance and differences are relevant, 'Treat like cases alike' must remain an empty form. To fill it we must know when, for the purposes in hand, cases are to be regarded as alike and what differences are relevant.

....Fundamental differences, in general moral and political outlook, may lead to irreconcilable differences and disagreement as to what characteristics of human beings are to be taken as relevant for the criticism of law as unjust.

....It is therefore clear that the criteria of relevant resemblances and differences may often vary with the fundamental moral outlook of a given person or society. Where this is so, assessments of the justice or injustice of the law may be met with counter-assertions inspired by a different morality. [H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 155-158]