Sources & Extracts

Review this excerpt and then go back to the main thread.

Moral philosophers have made a similar point about Herskovits' argument. He seems to have assumed that if scientific methods could not 'prove' that one set of moral principles were correct, then no other method was possible. For example, Brandt tells us:

The point of active debate is rather whether there is some method of ethical reasoning whose acceptance can be justified to thoughtful people with force comparable to the force with which acceptance of inductive logic can be justified. Is there any such method of ethical reasoning that can be expected in principle to show, when there is a conflict of values or ethical principles, that one and only one solution is correct in some important and relevant sense or "correct"? Metaethical relativists deny that there is any such method, and their denial may take either of two forms: They may deny that there is any method of ethical reasoning that can be justified with force comparable to that with which scientific method (inductive logic) can be justified. Or they may agree that there is such a method but say that its application is quite limited, and in particular that the fullest use of it could not show, in every case of a conflict of ethical convictions or of values, that one and only position is correct in any important sense of "correct." [Richard Brandt, "Ethical Relativism," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.]