Sources & Extracts

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Most discussions of ethical relativism distinguish it from the claim that whether an action is good or right depends at least in part on circumstances or context. This view is allowed by many traditional theories of ethics and does not, by itself, imply that ethical relativism is a correct meta-ethical theory. A traditional utilitarian moralist (i.e., one believes that actions are good because their consequences maximize human happiness or welfare) will agree that the same action may be good in one context and bad in another. This may be true because the consequences may vary with context. Richard Brandt makes a similar point in this extract:

One frequent confusion about what implies ethical relativism should be avoided. Suppose metaethical relativism is mistaken, and there is a single "correct" set of general ethical principles or value statements. It may still be true, and consistent with acceptance of this "correct" set of principles, that an act that is right in some circumstances will be wrong in other circumstances. Take, for instance, the possible "correct" principle "It is always right to do what will make all affected at least as happy as they could be made by any other possible action." It follows from this principle that in some situations it will be right to lie (for instance, to tell a man that he is not mortally ill when one knows he is, if he cannot bear the truth) and that in other situations it will be wrong to lie. Thus, even if metaethical relativism is false there is a sense in which the rightness of an act is relative to the circumstances or situation. The fact that the rightness of an act is relative to the circumstances in this way does not, of course, imply the truth of metaethical relativism. [Richard Brandt, "Ethical Relativism," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

A similar point is made by the philosopher John Ladd.

...[C]ultural relativism is supposed to show that what is right for one person in one social and cultural situation is wrong for another person in another social and cultural situation. There is, however, nothing especially novel about the contention that the rightness or wrongness of acts is dependent upon the agent's situation, including his social and cultural situation. It is generally agreed by moral philosophers of every school that circumstances require us to apply moral principles differently to different cases. [Ladd, "The Issue of Relativism" p. 110, in Ethical Relativism, ed. John Ladd, brackets added]