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There is no agreement among philosophers on the definition of 'ethical relativism' or 'moral relativism.' Each writer discusses various definitions and works primarily with one of his or her own choosing. It may be best to think of relativism as a family of notions with many similarities. Here are a few examples taken almost at random.

From Westermarck's Ethical Relativity (1932), p. 3, 60.

The supposed objectivity of moral values, as understood in this treatise, implies that they have a real existence apart from any reference to a human mind, that what is said to be good or bad, right or wrong, cannot be reduced merely to what people think to be good or bad, right or wrong. It makes morality a matter of truth and falsity, and to say that a judgment is true obviously means something different from the statement that it is thought to be true.

....I have thus arrived at the conclusion that neither the attempts of moral philosophers or theologians to prove the objective validity of moral judgments, nor the common sense assumption to the same effect, give us any right at all to accept such a validity as a fact....The reason for this is that in my opinion the predicates of all moral judgments, all moral concepts, are ultimately based on emotions, and that, as is very commonly admitted, no objectivity can come from an emotion.

From W. T. Stace, The Concept of Morals (1937), p. 8.

Any ethical position which denies that there is a single moral standard which is equally applicable to all men at all times may fairly be called a species of ethical relativity. There is not, the relativist asserts, merely one moral law, one code, one standard. There are many moral laws, codes, standards. What morality ordains in one place or age may be quite different from what morality ordains in another place or age.

....This does not mean merely - as one might at first sight be inclined to suppose - that the very same kind of action which is thought right in one country and period may be thought wrong in another.... What the relativist means to assert is, not this platitude, but that the very same kind of action which is right in one country and period may be wrong in another.

From Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory (1959), p. 271.

It is clarifying to substitute, in place of our initial statement of Protagoras' view, the following, as a brief formulation of the relativist thesis in ethics: "There are conflicting ethical opinions that are equally valid." But this formulation requires discussion in order to be clear.

The first thing to notice - although the fact will not be obvious until we have explained the phrase "equally valid" - is that the statement is about ethical opinions or statements, but is not a ethical statement itself.... It is a metaethical theory.

Next, the statement is cautious. It does not say that no ethical opinions are valid for everybody. It says only that some ethical opinions are not more valid than some other ethical opinions that conflict with them.

Third, our relativist thesis is not merely the claim that different individuals sometimes in fact have conflicting ethical opinions. It does assert this, but it goes further. It holds that the conflicting ethical opinions are equally valid. We do not establish this merely by showing that people disagree.

From Marcus Singer, Generalization in Ethics, (1961), p. 328.

Let us distinguish between moral (or cultural) diversity, and ethical (or moral) relativism. The two are distinct, and nothing but confusion can result from identifying them. That their names have so often varied may be a factor in this confusion. By cultural diversity (or relativity) I understand the empirically ascertained fact that there are a great many different and even conflicting rules and practices prevailing at different times and in different places, so that (what at least appears to be) the same act may be regarded as right in one place and as wrong in another. By ethical relativism I understand the theory that moral ideas are all necessarily "relative to" to (sic) a particular society, in the sense that they reflect the "standpoint" of some particular society and only "hold for" that society, so that in case of a conflict between these different standards there is no impartial or objective way of deciding between them; any reason that might be given would itself merely reflect the standpoint of the group to which one belongs.

From C. L. Stevenson, Facts and Values, (1963), p. 76.

So in its main form a relativistic theory of value is simply one that expands "X is good," for example, into "X is approved by _____." For certain cases the word "approved" may have to give place to some other attitude-designating term, such as "liked," "favored," or "esteemed"; but in all cases there is some counterpart of the blank. And for varying utterances of "good," relativism maintains, we must fill in the blank now with a reference to the speaker, now with a reference to some group to which the speaker belongs, now with reference merely to most or to many people at many or most times, now with a reference to certain people who are particularly familiar with X, and so on.

From Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (1972), p. 20.

Let us at this stage of the argument about subjectivism take a brief rest and look round a special view or assemblage of views which has been built on the site of moral disagreements between societies. This is relativism, the anthropolgists' (sic) heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy. In its vulgar an unregenerate form ... it consists of three propositions: that 'right' means ... 'right for a given society'; that 'right for a given society' is to be understood in a functionalist sense; and that (therefore) it is wrong for people in one society to condemn, interfere with, etc., the values of another society....

From Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, (1983), p. 131,

One (but by no means not the only) interpretation of the view called ethical relativism has this implication. On this interpretation, an act is right or wrong whenever the majority in any given society approves or disapproves of it, respectively. It is important to be clear about what, on this interpretation, ethical relativism comes to. The claim is not that a given act is thought to be right in a given society if the majority approves of it; not is it that the act of which a given society's majority approves is right in that society; rather, an act is unqualifiedly right, according to the interpretation presently under review, whenever the majority of the members of any given society happen to approve of it.

From John Ladd, editor, Ethical Relativism, (1985), introduction, p. 3.

[W]e can state the ethical relativist's argument schematically as follows: (a) morality is essentially dependent on other factors, say, a factor X; (b) factor X varies from society to society (or from class to class, from individual to individual, etc.); (c) therefore, morality is relative and varies from society to society, and so on.

From Paul Taylor, "Social Science and Ethical Relativism" in Ladd, Ethical Relativism, p. 96.

By "ethical relativism"...I shall mean... the assertion that two people or groups of people may hold contradictory ethical views without either being mistaken.

From Lawrence Hinman Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory (1998), p. 41.

Simply to state that different people in fact have different moral beliefs, without taking any stand on the rightness or wrongness of those beliefs, is to accept descriptive ethical relativism. This is, as I have already implied, a rather uncontroversial claim because it does not in any way commit us to saying that these other moral beliefs are also correct. Thus someone could be a moral absolutist (that is, someone who believes that there is one and only one true morality) and still accept descriptive ethical relativism because the absolutist would simply say that those who do not accept this true moral code are wrong. Description ethical relativism does not entail any beliefs about whether the moral codes of various societies are right or wrong.

The more controversial and interesting position is what we can call normative ethical relativism. The normative ethical relativist puts forward a crucial additional claim not found in description ethical relativism, namely, that each moral code is valid relative only to the culture in which it exists.

From Gilbert Harman in Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (1996) p. 5. (This volume contains statements by Harman defending a form of moral relativism and others by Judith Jarvis Thomson defending the claim that at least some moral statements can be true or false.)

Moral absolutism holds that there is a single true morality. Moral relativism claims instead....There is no single true morality. There are many different moral frameworks, none of which is more correct than the others.

From Harry Gensler Ethics: a Contemporary Introduction (1998) p. 12.

We can express ... [cultural relativism] most clearly as a definition: "X is good" means "The majority (of the society in question) approves of X." Other moral terms, like "bad" and "right" can be defined in a similar way. Note the reference to a specific society. Unless otherwise specified, the society in question is that of the person making the judgment. when I say "Hitler acted wrongly," I mean "according to the standards of my society." (brackets added)