Let
me try to summarize what you have been saying, since our time is just
about up for today.
We started out with three broad questions:
- What are the reasons for accepting or rejecting ethical
relativism as a meta-ethical theory?
- What are the main alternatives to ethical relativism?
- What are the reasons for accepting or rejecting the main
alternatives?
Ann pointed out that the analysis we use for statements like
"X is good" makes a difference for some of our issues. We
used an analysis from the philosopher David Wong.
John suggested that people often back into ethical relativism
because other alternatives seem to fail. In particular, many people
believe that attempts to prove or support ethical principles on the
basis of science, metaphysics, conceptual analysis, and theology have
all failed. To put it differently, they believe that attempts to put
ethics on an objective basis have failed.
We talked a little about science as a basis for ethics and about
two theories that attempt to prove ethical principles on the basis of
what might be called conceptual analysis. All of these approaches have
problems and none has attracted widespread support from moral
philosophers.
Ayesha made an interesting point. She said that ethical principles
may not be the sort of thing that can be true or false; but they can
be chosen on other grounds. I think that may be a good insight.
And finally, John made a useful suggestion. He pointed out
that Wong believes that even relativistic ethical systems can have
some of the characteristics of an objective morality. Objectivity may
not be an all-or-nothing feature of ethics. I think that's a good
point for you to think about for next week when we discuss ethical
knowledge. Perhaps half a loaf is better than none.
In our next session we are going to assume that some form of
ethical relativism is a correct theory and ask about its implications.
I'll see you then.