I
don't think the relativist can say that rules or principles are true
or false. That's the point I have been trying to make all along, and I
still think that the older anthropologists were on to something when
they made a similar point.Specific moral judgments such as "It is wrong for John to kill
Peter" can be true because it violates the rule "It is
morally wrong to kill innocent human beings." But rules and standards
themselves aren't the kind of thing that can be true or false.
Suppose we had a rule that said "Turn out the lights when you
leave the building." It isn't the sort of statement that can be
true or false. It falls into a different category.
But if we cannot say that standards are true or false, we can say
other things about them. For example:
- Standards are better or worse in some respect.
- Standards are applicable or inapplicable.
- Standards are accepted or rejected.
- Standards are conducive to human happiness or misery.
What I'm suggesting is that when we shift from moral judgments to
moral standards or first principles, we can no longer talk about truth
and falsity. We have to talk about something else.
For example, the Catholic principle "It is morally wrong to
kill innocent human beings" might be accepted because it will
protect human life, help people to live without fear of attack, and so
on.