I
think Fred is right, though. It seems odd to say that a moral judgment
can be true and false at the same time. In natural science or
mathematics we would throw out a theory that allowed for that sort of
thing.
Maybe we should ask ourselves why it is that ethical relativism seems plausible to
many people in spite of that fact.
I think the answer is that many people 'back into' relativism. They
are confronted by a range of conflicting moral judgments and
principles and there seems to be no way to prove that one and only
one judgment or principle is correct.
This gets us into Professor Sidgwick's second question: What are
the alternatives to ethical relativism. To avoid being backed into
relativism, there must be an alternative.
Science is one alternative, but it seems unable to do the job.
There is a long history of doubt concerning the ability of scientific
methods to yield values, value judgments, moral principles, and moral
ideals.
But if we cannot use science to prove moral principles, then how
can we say that one principle is superior or correct?