I
think the ethical relativist can do a number of things in addition to
trying to achieve wide reflective equilibrium.
I have read some of the work of Tom Regan on making moral judgments
and selecting moral principles. Let me say right off that Regan argues
against ethical relativism. But in spite of that fact, I think
that a relativist could adopt most of the method that Regan outlines.
Regan talks about how to make our moral judgments "as free
from fault and error as possible" and he lists six
requirements for making such judgments:
- conceptual clarity
- full information or knowledge of the facts
- rationality (meaning that our thinking should be logical)
- impartiality (meaning the similar treatment of similar
individuals)
- coolness (meaning that we should not make judgments in an
emotionally excited state of mind)
- reliance on "valid moral principles"
Regan also lists several criteria for choosing "valid
moral principles:"
- consistency
- adequate scope
- precision (meaning that the principle should not be so vague
as to be of little use as a guide)
- conformity with considered moral intuitions (It is here that
Regan incorporates Rawls' concept of narrow reflective equilibrium
between moral judgments and moral principles)
As I said, Regan rejects ethical relativism. His ideas on
consistency and scope are not ones that a relativist would accept. But
with some suitable modification, I think that a relativist could
accept most of Regan's requirements.
All of this may or may not give us moral knowledge, but a
relativist could claim that it gives us good reason to accept a set
of moral principles.