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Joel Feinberg discusses the equal treatment principle in his book Social Philosophy. Most philosophers agree that while correct, the principle leaves important questions unanswered.

The basic principle of comparative justice is that like cases are to be treated alike and different cases to be treated differently. . . . If Doe and Roe are exactly alike in every respect, but one is given more than the other, the discrimination in their treatment is totally arbitrary, and arbitrary discrimination is the essence of comparative injustice. . . .

Any two persons or things will differ in some respects, and it is always possible to cite some difference between them in support (more precisely, in justicization) of differences in the way they are treated. Clearly, then, comparative justice requires more than that difference in treatment be based on differences in characteristics. The underlying differences between individuals that justicize differences in their treatment must be relevant differences, and the underlying similarities that justicize similar treatment must be relevant similarities.

Feinberg goes on to make the distinction between a formal and material principle of justice and apply it to this case.

The principle of like treatment, then, is only a starting place in the analysis of comparative justice, and needs supplementation by criteria for determining the relevance of differences. For that reason, the like treatment principle is usually said to be merely a formal principle of justice, and the criteria of relevance for various contexts of justice with which it must be supplemented are called material principles of justice.

Reference: From Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, p. 99.