Sources & Extracts

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Many moral philosophers have made many arguments to prove that individuals have certain rights or at least to give reasons for holding such a position. In the following extract Gregory Vlastos pretends that we are trying to explain to someone from a different culture why we believe that all individuals have the same rights. He also gives some idea of what those common human rights are. His argument rests on the claim that all persons possess equal "individual worth" independent of any considerations of merit.

'To understand our code you should take into account how very different from yours is our own estimate of the relative worth of the welfare and freedom of different individuals. . . . In all cases where human beings are capable of enjoying the same goods, we feel that the intrinsic value of their enjoyment is the same. In just this sense we hold that (1) one man's well-being is as valuable as any other's. And there is a parallel difference in our feeling for freedom. . . . For us (2) one man's freedom is as valuable as any other's.'

Vlastos goes on to make the connection between equal value and equal rights. Again, he refers to a fictitious visitor from another culture.

No matter how unreasonable he might think of us he would feel it entirely reasonable that, since we do believe in equal value of human well-being and freedom, we should also believe in the prima facie equality of men's right to well-being and to freedom. He would see the former as a good reason for the latter; or, more formally, he could think of (1) and (2) respectively as the crucial premises in justification arguments whose respective conclusions would be: (3) One man's (prima facie) right to well-being is equal to that of any other, and (4) One man's (prima facie) right to freedom is equal to that of any other. Then, given (4) he could see how this would serve as the basis for a great variety of rights to specific kinds of freedom: freedom of movement, of association, of suffrage, of speech, of thought, of worship, of choice of employment, and the like. . . . Moreover, given (3), he could see in it the basis for various welfare-rights, such as the right to education, medical care, work under decent conditions, relief in periods of unemployment, leisure, housing, etc.

Reference: From Gregory Vlatos, "Justice and Equality," in Social Justice edited by Richard Brandt, p. 51-52.