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The British philosopher D. D. Raphael makes an argument similar to Ann's in the following passage. He is discussing legislation that prohibits private businessmen from discriminating on the basis of color.

. . . [I]f for special reasons serious social harm is caused by leaving complete freedom to employers, hoteliers, property owners, etc., in their choice of applicants for jobs or clients for rooms and houses, the State may well be justified in laying upon them by statute a duty of non-discrimination. . . .

What sort of social harm justifies such legislation? There will not be universal agreement about the answer to this question. . . .[T]here is liable to be difference of opinion on the extent to which the State should restrict freedom for the sake of worthy social aims. I suggest that legislation against discrimination is justified where the discrimination in question has the effect of depriving a group of people of benefits that are generally acknowledged to be common rights. That is why the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [put forward by the United Nations] limits its denunciation of discrimination to the field of human or common rights, rights that are considered essential for tolerable human life in civilized society. For example, if there is a widespread practice of discriminating against coloured people in accepting applicants for employment, or in letting rooms in hotels, or in selling houses, this causes grave hardship for a coloured man in finding a job, a bed for the night, or a place to live in. On the other hand, if the discrimination results in annoyance and resentment, but no real difficulty in meeting essential needs, there is insufficient warrant to legislate.

Reference: From Problems of Political Philosophy, p. 127. Brackets added.