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There can also be conflicts between rights. In some cases it seems that violating or limiting one right can lead to fewer violations of others. Should we have a 7:00pm curfew for everyone in order to reduce crime?

There are many interesting questions about moral rights. Are they acquired gradually or all at once? If gradually, when does one acquire 'full' moral rights? This issue has practical importance. Is it permissible, for example, to have a curfew for teenagers but not for adults? Or, assuming that abortion is morally permissible for adults, should it also be available for a 14 year old girl?


A right is said to be "absolute" if we ought to respect it under all possible circumstances. If there are circumstances (likely or unlikely) under which we ought to violate or override a right (or at least circumstances in which we would be justified in violating or overriding a right), then we should not call it "absolute." Sometimes philosophers refer to such rights as "prima facie." These rights can be justly abridged or overridden for the sake of other important moral concerns. Whether people have any absolute rights is a question that philosophers continue to debate. It is generally agreed, however, that if a right is violated for a good reason, the person having the right may be owed some compensation. Do you think that people have any absolute rights?
How would you settle these cases of conflict between different individual rights, or between individual rights and the welfare of some larger group?
The relationship between utility and rights becomes more complex when we look at the views of different philosophers. Many utilitarians speak of rights founded on utility. In such a theory, rights are justified by their LONG-term utility. But there may still be conflicts between rights and SHORT-term utility. There may also be conflicts between the utility of a particular act and the utility of a type of act to which it belongs. (Should we let a proven murderer go free because his right to speak with his lawyer was violated?)
On the other hand, some philosophers who make rights fundamental are willing to grant that rights may be abridged or overridden to avoid catastrophic consequences for human welfare. Judith Thomson asks us to consider whether someone ought to drive across private property in order to save the life of a sick child? If we answer "yes," it means not only that the property right in question is not absolute, but that it may be justly abridged in order to avoid a human tragedy. A case like this leads us to ask for a principle indicating when a right ought to be abridged.