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Both of these arguments confront a series of standard problems, some of which have already been mentioned.
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Thomson herself asks what it would be permissible to do if pregnancy
only lasted one hour. She believes that the "decent" thing would
be to have the baby, although the fetus would still not have a
right to its mother's body. Philosopher John Finnis asks whether
we would agree with Thomson's analysis of the violinist's case
if the person with good kidneys had to dismember and kill the
violinist in order to detach him.
We could combine these questions. Suppose the violinist only had to be attached to someone else for one hour and had to be dismembered in order to be detached. Would it still be morally permissible to detach him? If we say yes, how does this case differ from the case of Smith's driveway (described in the next paragraph)?
Consider this case: We agree that Smith has a right to drive his
car out of the driveway to his home. But suppose someone has fallen
down unconscious on the driveway. Does Smith's right to drive
out imply the right to drive over (and kill) the unconscious person?
After all, it's his driveway! Assume that he never gave the unconscious
person permission to be there.
Why does it seem that Smith's property right to the driveway does not include the right to drive over an unconscious man? Is it the fact that the man will be killed if he does while Smith will only be inconvenienced if he doesn't? Is there some principle of proportion that should be observed? Is there some inherent limit to Smith's right that we haven't clarified? Is it the other man's right to life? Something else? What do you think? Can you connect these considerations to abortion?