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Consider this possibility: A woman has a rare blood type from which a serum can be made that will cure hundreds of people with a deadly disease. To save them she must give blood twice a week for a year. Everyone would agree that it would be noble and good for her to give her blood, but is she morally obliged to do so? The sick people have the same right to life as anyone; but do they, for all that, have a right to her blood?

Suppose the sick people are members of her family. Does that matter? Does it increase her obligations? Suppose that she is partly responsible for spreading the disease? Does that change things? Suppose she is in good health and giving blood is not a risk. We may even suppose that a quick and painless method for drawing blood has been developed. On the other hand, the sick people will die without the serum. Does this difference in risk, pain, and benefit matter? Why or why not?

Thomson herself asks what it would be permissible to do if pregnancy only lasted one hour. She believes that the "decent" thing would be to have the baby, although the fetus would still not have a right to the use of its mother's body. Philosopher John Finnis asks whether we would agree with Thomson's analysis of the violinist's case if the person with good kidneys had to dismember and kill the violinist in order to detach him.

We could combine these questions. Suppose the violinist only had to be attached to someone else for one hour and had to be dismembered in order to be detached. Would it still be morally permissible to detach him? If we say yes, how does this case differ from the case of Smith's driveway?