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Thinking about the nature of personhood leads to another question
that is important for the debate over abortion: What is the moral
importance of potential personhood?
This question is important for all sides in the debate. If you adopt a narrow definition of personhood, you must explain why potential is not important. (After all, a 3 month old fetus clearly has the potential to become a person like you or I.) If you adopt a broad definition, you must explain why potential is important. (Despite its potential, a 3 month old fetus lacks all of the characteristics we associate with people in everyday life.)
On the other hand, in some cases potential seems to be very important.
Robert Wennberg has pointed out that most of us think that killing
infants is morally impermissible and that we think it is wrong
because it harms the infant. Yet the infant has not yet actualized
the qualities of persons. It seems to have its value and rights
(whatever they are) because of its potential to become like you
or I. In this case, it seems that potential carries enormous moral
weight.
In developing a position on abortion, the problem of potential arises over and over again. How would you resolve it?
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