Rights and Concepts
	CONTINUE ON	Review Related Ideas and then Return Here	Source

Michael Tooley, like Feinberg, has attempted to formulate a necessary condition for possessing rights and apply it to the case of abortion.

Tooley argues that 'person' should be defined as a being possessing a serious right to life. He goes on to argue that to possess such a right a thing must desire to continue to exist as a subject of experiences. Furthermore, to have such a desire a being must possess the concept of an entity that continues to exist as a subject of experiences and also believe itself to be such an entity.

Tooley's necessary condition is difficult to meet. Fetuses and infants fail to do so. Can you defend or criticize his view?

If you think of the embry or the fetus of six or seven months as a potential person only, then ask yourself what sorts of rights, if any, a potential person may have? Does a potential person have no rights? The same rights as a developed person? Weaker rights than a developed person? Most of all, why you hold your beliefs?

Ariadne Home	Abortion Bibliography	Abortion Home